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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
On December 6-7, 2005, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) held a two-
day roundtable meeting to examine some of the major psychosocial issues associated with 
radiological terrorism. The discussion, Roundtable on the Psychosocial Challenges Posed by 
a Radiological Terrorism Incident, explored such difficult and complex problems as planning 
for and assisting large numbers of people who may self-transport to healthcare facilities, 
preventing or mitigating contamination-related social stigma, and maintaining public trust 
following a large-scale incident involving radioactive materials. The aim was to begin to 
determine where there are major gaps in our current ability to handle these challenges, and 
then to identify steps that can be taken to help close those gaps. 
 
Nearly 30 U.S. and international experts from academia, government, professional societies, 
and the healthcare community participated in the program. The event was hosted by CDC’s 
Radiation Studies Branch, Division of Environmental Hazards and Health Effects, National 
Center for Environmental Health. The roundtable was part of CDC’s continuing effort to help 
prepare the nation’s medical and public health community for threats of terrorism. 
 
This report provides a summary of participants’ comments, ideas, and recommendations. 
The findings will inform CDC’s work with state and local health departments, hospitals and 
other key components of the preparedness infrastructure, and will help CDC in the 
production of guidelines, templates, and informational materials related to radiological 
terrorism. In addition, the report is intended to stimulate further discussion and 
consideration of some of the most challenging aspects of the management of terrorist 
incidents involving radioactive materials. 
 
Verbatim comments are highlighted throughout the report to illustrate key points. These 
comments are provided without attribution to maintain the confidentiality offered to the 
roundtable participants. In addition, it should be noted that this was not a consensus 
development conference, and the ideas and recommendations summarized in this report do 
not reflect a consensus process or decision on the part of the roundtable participants or 
CDC. 
 
The first part of the report provides brief summaries of five background presentations given 
by invited U.S. and international experts at the roundtable. This is followed by a discussion 
of key issues and considerations that were discussed by participants in the roundtable. 
Participants’ primary recommendations are then presented, as are other ideas and 
suggestions. A concluding section then highlights key findings of the roundtable and 
identifies future directions. 
 
A list of roundtable participants, the roundtable’s agenda, and a list of resources and 
references identified during roundtable discussions are also included in appendices to this 
report. 
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Chapter II: Summary of Presentations 
 
The two-day roundtable began with a series of presentations on radiological terrorism and 
psychosocial issues. Given by invited experts from the U.S. and abroad, the presentations 
were intended to provide the background and context for the roundtable, review previous 
experience and current research, and help identify key issues for discussion.  
 
 
Charles Miller, PhD 
Chief, Radiation Studies Branch  
National Center for Environmental Health 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
 
Dr. Miller began by describing CDC’s role in a radiological terrorism event. As part of HHS, 
CDC would be the chief public health entity to respond to a radiological incident. As the chief 
public health entity, CDC’s specific roles and responsibilities would include:  
• Assessing the health of people affected by the incident  
• Assessing the medical effects of radiological exposures on people in the community, 
emergency responders and other workers, and high-risk populations (such as 
children, pregnant women, and those with immune deficiencies)  
• Advising state and local health departments on how to protect people, animals, and 
food and water supplies from contamination by radioactive materials  
• Providing technical assistance and consultation to state and local health departments 
on medical treatment, follow-up, and decontamination of victims exposed to 
radioactive materials  
• Establishing and maintaining a registry of people exposed to or contaminated by 
radioactive materials  
CDC’s Radiation Studies Branch has been primarily responsible for radiological and nuclear 
emergency preparedness in the agency since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. 
 
Citing a survey initiated by U.S. Senator Richard Lugar’s office in 2005, Dr. Miller noted that 
terrorism experts believe that there is about a 70 percent chance terrorists will attack the 
United States with a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) at some point in the next ten 
years. The study defined WMD as a radiological, nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon. An 
attack involving a nuclear weapon, while not out of the question, was viewed as the least 
likely of those four scenarios. On the other hand, a radiological attack (e.g., a dirty bomb, 
or radiological dispersal device), was seen as among the most likely of the scenarios. 
 
Dr. Miller said that the psychosocial impacts of a radiological terrorist attack, regardless of 
the number of deaths, would likely be far-reaching. Contamination-related issues could also 
make response and recovery much more difficult. He cited the disposal of contaminated 
bodies as one of several vexing and emotionally charged issues communities would face.  
 
Complicating the problem are common misperceptions about radiation. Some people, for 
example, believe that any radiation exposure at all inevitably translates into “a death 
sentence.” More generally, radiation is greatly feared and there is a lack of knowledge about 
protective actions. 
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Misperceptions among the public, as well as the medical community, include “there is no 
safe radiation dose” and “safe equals no risk whatsoever.” He said that clinicians and public 
health workers do not feel sufficiently prepared for a radiological terrorism event. Some 
research even suggests that there may be a potential unwillingness to report to work in a 
radiological event because of fear of contamination. “Some hospitals have flat out said that 
their first response in a radiological event would be to call security and lock down the 
hospital,” he said.   
 
Miller concluded by explaining that CDC is committed to tackling these issues, and has 
developed a variety of new training and informational products to help assist clinicians and 
public health professionals in preparing for a radiological incident. These include satellite 
broadcasts, web-based content, reports, CDs, videos, DVDs, pocket tools, “just in time” 
training, fact sheets, and other print materials (visit www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/). CDC has 
also held roundtables on critical preparedness issues, including communication, first 
receiver issues, and population monitoring. The present roundtable on the psychosocial 
challenges posed by a radiological terrorism incident is an important step in determining 
additional areas of emphasis for future informational and training efforts. 
 
 
Steven M. Becker, PhD  
Associate Professor of Environmental Health Science, and 
Director, Disaster and Emergency Communication Research Unit 
The University of Alabama at Birmingham School of Public Health 
 
Dr. Becker discussed the nature of the radiological terrorism threat and its psychosocial 
dimensions. He noted that even in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, relatively little 
attention was devoted to preparedness for terrorism involving radioactive materials. There 
were many reasons for this, but perhaps the most important was the pressing need to fill 
huge preparedness gaps related to chemical, and especially, biological agents. 
 
More recently, however, the threat of radiological terrorism has moved up on the nation’s 
preparedness agenda. The rapid rise in concern stems from a series of interconnected 
factors. At the most basic level, sources of radiation are ubiquitous. They have become 
essential to modern living and are found everywhere: hospitals, medical facilities, research 
and educational laboratories, industrial manufacturing and commercial facilities, etc. There 
are today millions of sources of radiation in this country and tens of thousands of sources in 
developing counties. Many of these sources remain highly vulnerable. As a 2003 federal 
report noted, many sources – even in a post 9/11 world -- are either unsecured or provided 
at best with an industrial level of security. One of the biggest concerns: large tele-therapy 
sources in hospitals.  There is also a continuing problem with missing, lost, stolen or 
abandoned sources. Dr. Becker cited a 19,000-curie source that had been abandoned in 
Côte d’Ivoire before being recovered by the International Atomic Energy Agency. This was 
clearly a “success story”; but for every success, there are probably other sources that 
remain unrecovered and still pose a threat. 
 
Greatly adding to concern about the potential for radiological terrorism is a very robust 
black market in radioactive sources. Dr. Becker cited numerous recent trafficking examples, 
including one from Thailand and another from the Czech Republic. Furthermore, there have 
been various alleged attempts by known terrorist organizations to acquire radioactive 
materials, and some terrorist organizations have reportedly experimented with radiological 
weapons. Finally, recent intelligence assessments have concluded that should terrorists 
succeed in creating a radiological device, they have the determination to use it. 
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Dr. Becker stated that although radiological terrorist scenarios can vary widely depending 
on such factors as the radioactive material used, internal vs. external hazard, size and type 
of device, weather conditions, etc., all radiological terrorism situations have one important 
thing in common: the capacity to produce high levels of fear and a host of social, 
psychological, behavioral, and public health impacts. Drawing on previous research and 
historical experience, Dr. Becker noted that the potential consequences include large-scale 
spontaneous evacuation, widespread social stigma, and the flooding of healthcare facilities 
with people who fear that they may have been exposed or contaminated. He cited the well-
known example of the 1987 Goiania, Brazil accident involving cesium 137, where 112,000 
people – even individuals from locations far away from the accident – sought examinations. 
 
He also spoke about his research on stigma after the 1999 nuclear criticality accident in 
Tokaimura, Japan. Even though there was no significant off-site contamination, area 
farmers were unable to sell their produce because the public was afraid the products were 
tainted. Some stores even posted signs saying their produce was not from Tokai, and 
people from the Tokai area reported being subjected to subtle forms of discrimination in 
other parts of the country. For example, when checking into hotels while on vacation, 
individuals from Tokai were asked not to use the public baths. Such stigma and 
discrimination, which is common in situations involving invisible toxic agents, can create 
enormous problems for response and recovery efforts. 
 
Dr. Becker concluded by saying that the social, psychological, and behavioral effects of a 
radiological terrorism event could be widespread and profound, and in some scenarios, 
might even be the principal impact. As such, these factors require far more attention in all 
phases of preparedness and response than they have received to date. “This is a strategic 
issue … and it’s going to be a major factor in determining whether we are successful in 
managing a large-scale radiological terrorism event.”    
 
 
Randal Beaton, PhD, EMT  
Research Professor 
Department of Psychosocial and Community Health 
Schools of Nursing and Public Health and Community Medicine 
University of Washington 
 
Dr. Beaton discussed lessons learned from the sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway 
system in 1995. In that attack, sarin gas, a very potent neurotoxin, was covertly and 
simultaneously released on several sections of the Tokyo subway at about 8:00 a.m. He 
said that 12 people died in the incident and more than 5,500 people sought medical care. 
Many complained of eye pain, headaches, tearing, and breathing difficulties, and some were 
seriously ill.   
 
Most of the people who showed up at St. Luke’s, the nearby receiving hospital, were “walk-
ins.” There was a decision to convert the non-medical spaces, such as the chapel, into 
patient holding areas. Dr. Beaton mentioned calculations by the Defense Department that 
for every primary casualty of the attack, an additional four people sought treatment. While 
clearly a very rough estimate, it provides some indication of the scale of the influx of 
patients that hospitals could experience in a similar incident in this country. 
 
In considering the large numbers in Tokyo, he offered these potential contributing factors: 
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• A covert, human-caused, malevolent, surprise attack 
• Lack of preparedness to respond to such an unconventional mass casualty event 
• Lack of diagnostic tests to quickly and accurately differentiate exposure victims from 
“worried individuals” 
• The undetectable nature of the agent (colorless, nearly odorless and tasteless) 
• Initial confusion in positively identifying the agent 
• The fact that the agent was horrific, dangerous, and potentially lethal 
• The crowded conditions in the subway trains 
• The enclosed, confined and subterranean nature of Tokyo subway “tubes” 
• Media accounts and rumors 
• Public lack of familiarity with the agent and, to a lesser extent, health providers’ lack of 
familiarity, training, and relevant education 
 
All of these factors, suggested Dr. Beaton, could be relevant to a terrorist event involving 
radioactive materials. 
 
In planning for future events, Dr. Beaton suggested that hospitals try to 1) screen and 
evaluate incoming patients, 2) conduct decontamination, 3) establish a holding area away 
from where people are being treated, 4) track people who are thought to be okay in case 
they display symptoms later on, 5) provide reassurance and information on self-care, and 
6) monitor patients for reemergence of symptoms. 
 
 
Shin-ichi Ishimatsu, MD  
Emergency Medical Physician 
St. Luke’s International Hospital 
Tokyo, Japan 
 
Dr. Ishimatsu, who is an emergency medical physician at St. Luke’s International Hospital, 
discussed his experience in treating victims of the 1995 sarin gas attacks in Tokyo. As Chief 
of the Emergency Department at the time, he was directly involved in receiving, evaluating, 
and providing care to patients. 
 
Dr. Ishimatsu outlined the incident, saying that the terrorists had attacked three lines and 
five trains with sarin. He identified several factors that greatly complicated the hospital’s 
emergency response: 
 
• There was initial confusion about the nature of the agent involved, with some at the 
hospital believing it might be organo-phosphate poisoning. It was not until several hours 
later that sarin was implicated. 
• Large numbers of people showed up on their own (on foot, by taxi, and other means) 
rather than being processed through the ambulance system. This made overall 
management difficult. 
• “Walk-ins” arrived on their own before those who were more seriously injured. 
• The hospital was inundated with people, including members of the press who “without 
consideration” took photos and made broadcasts. 
• There were concerns about secondary contamination of hospital staff. 
• There was a lack of resources for caring for the victims. 
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Dr. Ishimatsu said that no one was turned away from the hospital and that “mild” patients 
were observed for a half-day, given an information leaflet, and told that there would be a 
follow-up survey and medical examination. He stressed the importance of providing long-
term follow-up and care for all patients, regardless of whether they were physically injured 
by the incident. 
 
Colonel Yaron Bar Dayan, MD, MHA 
Chief Medical Officer 
Home Front Command Medical Department 
Israel 
 
Major Adi Leiba, MD 
Coordinator for Non-Conventional Scenarios 
Home Front Command Medical Department 
Israel 
 
Dr. Bar Dayan and Dr. Leiba gave a joint presentation on their research and experiences 
dealing with terrorism and managing mass casualty incidents in Israel. Working with 24 
general hospitals, the Medical Department of Israel’s Home Front Command conducts 
education programs and emergency drills on wartime and peacetime threats. During mass 
casualty incidents, it serves as the national medical operations center, the coordinating arm 
between the incident scene and responding hospitals. 
 
Dr. Bar-Dayan said that when people are mildly injured, they often go to the hospital on 
their own. They do not wait to be transported by emergency services. As a result, people 
experiencing high levels of anxiety arrive at the hospital before people who are physically 
injured. To manage the influx of people and the potential drain on hospital resources, the 
plan is to treat the injured at the hospital, while directing those considered “mildly injured” 
to nearby facilities called, “mild casualty centers.”  Mild casualty diagnoses include mild 
intoxication (chemical or radiological), iatrogenesis, exacerbation of chronic diseases 
(pulmonary or cardiac diseases), and stress victims or those described as “worried well.” 
 
A triage medical team stationed at the hospital gate interfaces with people as they arrive, 
conducts initial triage, and either directs the individuals into the hospital for further 
assessment or refers them to a mild casualty center. The centers are staffed with 
emergency physicians as well as psychologists and psychiatrists. In addition, a hospital 
military unit is assigned to each hospital to support surge operations in wartime scenarios.   
 
Dr. Leiba elaborated that when hospitals are overwhelmed and incoming members of the 
public are sent elsewhere, it is important to send people to places that are familiar to them.  
“Simply setting up a tent complex and calling it a military hospital won’t work,” he said. 
 
Dr. Leiba said that the policy for a chemical incident is to instruct mild casualties to change 
their clothes, but not undergo decontamination. “That would make them more worried and 
there is no need to do this,” he said.  In a radiological incident, the policy is to monitor 
patients for radiation and conduct decontamination only if there are signs of contamination.   
 
There are three psychological phases: acute stress reaction, permanent anticipatory stress, 
and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Dr. Leiba said manmade toxic hazards cause 
greater fear than natural disasters because of the uncertainties involved and that radiation-
induced anxiety is a long-lasting phenomenon, which was borne out by an Israeli study of 
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the stress levels of 40 immigrants (ages 25 to 55) from Chernobyl. Furthermore, a 
radiological terrorist event, he said, could result in contamination-related stigma and loss of 
trust in societal institutions.   
 
Dr. Leiba stressed the importance of empowering the public to take action for its own health 
and safety. It is vital to “give the population responsibility, give them knowledge,” he said. 
“That’s why in Israel we believe in giving the population masks and atropine injectors, and 
the medications they need.”  Providing information before an event, such as conducting 
preparedness education in the schools, is another aspect of the Israeli program.  “Each year 
we go into every school in all grades and train the students how to respond,” Dr. Bar-Dayan 
said.  He also said that it is important to line up respected opinion leaders to talk to the 
media in times of crisis as a way of reducing public anxiety about what may happen. 
 
Chapter III: Key Issues and Considerations 
 
Following the five background presentations, roundtable participants began a series of 
focused discussions of psychosocial issues associated with a radiological terrorism event. 
The aim was to identify key challenges and their implications for medical and public health 
preparedness. 
 
Issue 1: Impacts 
A radiological terrorist attack could result in widespread and 
profound psychosocial impacts at all levels of society.   
 
Contamination-related social stigma, chronic anxiety and emotional distress, refusal to 
return to homes and workplaces because of fear of contamination, long-term disruption due 
to population evacuation or relocation, a major surge in demand for medical attention, loss 
of trust and confidence in societal institutions: these were seen as some of the more 
serious, potential psychosocial impacts that could result from a large-scale radiological 
terrorist attack. 
Avoiding or reducing these potential impacts represents a challenge for emergency 
planning, emergency management, medical and public health agencies. 
1. Public fear of radiation – A large body of 
research shows that radiation is among the 
most dreaded of all hazards. How can 
healthcare providers and public health 
professionals deal with the public’s fear and 
anxiety? What are the implications of public 
fear for response and recovery efforts? 
2. Hospital preparedness – How can 
hospitals plan for a large-scale radiological attack, including its psychosocial effects?  What 
special plans and resources need to be in place? What are the incentives for increasing 
hospital preparedness in this area?  How can rural medical facilities prepare for psychosocial 
impacts, considering their limited resources?  How could they handle populations self-
evacuating from nearby urban areas? 
 “Where does fear go?  Fear of 
contamination, fear that somehow 
you’ll be labeled and stigmatized?  
Fear causes some to withdraw and 
others to become hostile.” 
3. Managing a potential flood of “walk-ins” – How can hospitals prepare for the 
anticipated influx of people that would overwhelm hospital resources in a radiological 
attack? What should be done to assist the influx of people who are not physically injured but 
are demanding medical services?  What can do done to help people who don’t need to be 
admitted to the hospital but have clear needs? 
4. Lack of training within the healthcare community – What can/should be done to 
address misperceptions about radiological contamination? What can be done to address the 
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lack of education and training on these issues within the medical and public health 
community? 
5. Communication, trust, and credibility – How can emergency information be 
transmitted in a way that enables people to take appropriate self-protective actions and 
builds a sense of efficacy?  What can be done to increase the trust and credibility of 
agencies and officials who are responsible for public communications? 
6. Social stigma – How might stigma play out in a large-scale radiological terrorism 
incident on the U.S. mainland? How might 
social stigma affect healthcare utilization, 
community support, and community recovery? 
How does the “radiation factor” affect the way 
that displaced populations are received? How 
will people and communities respond to the 
burial of radioactive human remains? What can 
be done to reduce stigmatization of people, products, and places associated with 
radiological exposure or contamination? 
“How will people and 
communities respond to the 
burial of radioactive remains?” 
7. The safety benchmark – How should “safe” or “clean” be defined in a post-attack 
environment? How should healthcare providers respond when public institutions disagree on 
“what is safe?”   
 
Issue 2: A Need to Replace the Term “Worried Well” 
There is a need for a new term (to replace “worried well”) that 
refers to large numbers of concerned and anxious people, some 
experiencing stress-related symptoms, who self-report to 
healthcare facilities, and who may need examinations, care, and 
attention but do not need to be admitted to a hospital. 
 
Participants of the roundtable agreed that there is 
a pressing need for a term that refers to large 
numbers of worried, concerned, and anxious 
people who are not physically injured, but who are 
fearful of potential contamination, and who go to 
hospitals and medical facilities on their own 
requesting medical services. Collectively, the large 
numbers of such individuals can rapidly overwhelm 
facilities’ resources to respond.  
 
 “We have to think long and 
hard about what we call 
things.  The terms we use are 
very powerful.”  
Some participants said that “worried well” is a pejorative, dismissive term that implies that 
those so-labeled need not be taken seriously. Participants also said that while the term is 
commonly used for planning purposes, it is non-specific and ambiguous. “Worried well” 
means different things to different people, and this inconsistency presents a problem. 
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A medical model, for example, uses the term to refer to anyone who comes to the hospital 
but does not need to be admitted. In a response, the term has no utility because it is a 
retrospective diagnosis – people cannot be determined “well” until they’ve been assessed.  
Hence, these individuals cannot be segregated because they, like those desperately needing 
medical treatment, are making demands that must be addressed.   
Participants noted that everyone seeking medical attention is, in fact, either a patient or a 
potential patient.  Moreover, such individuals may not be “well” at all; they may be 
symptomatic or emotionally distressed, or they may be exhibiting signs of pre-existing 
illnesses. Or they may have been exposed to radiation, have a definite need to be assessed, 
but are not yet showing physical signs of exposure. 
One participant said that it is important to distinguish people who are distressed from those 
who are symptomatic, but not severely. Another said that the term “distressed” connotes a 
form of disease and implies that the individual needs treatment. Conversely, he said term 
“well” might convince people that they do not require medical services. Another participant 
suggested adding a fourth category of triage that is distinct from “critical,” “intermediate,” 
and “walking wounded.” Otherwise, he said, they’re going to get mixed in with those who 
need immediate medical help.   
It was suggested that this influx of people be defined according to their own goals and 
behaviors (e.g., people wanting to know whether they’ve been “affected”), and the goals 
and behaviors that emergency clinicians want to encourage (e.g., people who have been 
potentially exposed should go home, not to the hospital, shower and change their clothes).   
Based on that premise, the group discussed a variety of terms that could potentially replace 
the term “worried well”:   
• Patients and potential patients 
• Stress reaction  
• Exposure reaction 
• Nervous, not yet diagnosed 
• Exposed but not yet diagnosed 
• Not yet diagnosed, but non-symptomatic 
• Mild casualties (everyone who is not moderate or severe) 
• Exposure concerned  
• Anticipatory exposed concerned 
• Non-toxic  
• Ambulatory and non-ambulatory 
• Reassurance-seeking citizens, diagnosis-seeking citizens, and reassurance- and 
assessment-seeking citizens 
• OMMUS (outbreaks of multiple or medically unexplained symptoms) 
• MUPS (multiple unexplained physical symptoms) 
• Concerned individuals 
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No single term was seen to be wholly satisfactory. But participants expressed the view that 
it was important for the discussion about replacing “worried well” to continue, both among 
mental health professionals and in the broader preparedness and response community. 
 
 
This report is a summary of the participants’ contributions; it represents neither a consensus of the roundtable nor the opinion of 
CDC, and may contain errors in fact. 
13
Issue 3: Drivers of Behavior and Mental Health 
How people respond to radiological incidents is a reflection of 
psychological drivers of behavior, such as fear, anxiety, and the 
natural desire to take action to protect one’s health. This is not 
the same thing as addressing the mental health needs of 
individuals as a result of the incident. Both are important – but 
distinct – aspects of “psychosocial.” 
 
Once we understand the psychological drivers of behavior specific to radiological terrorism, 
we can craft a more powerful communication and operational interventions to address them.  
It is critically important to recognize that addressing psychological drivers of behavior (the 
emotional reasons why people do the things they do and what triggers them) is distinct 
from providing mental health services to people who have experienced such an event.  
When we discuss the “psychosocial impact” we are really talking about two things: how and 
why people behave the way they do in response to the event, and the mental health needs 
that emerge as a result of the event. 
“The situation at the Superdome (after Hurricane Katrina) was horrific and people were 
really frightened. These people were not seeking mental health care…. What we’re talking 
about with “psychosocial issues” often is not mental health care services. It’s the 
psychological ramifications that drive behavior, that drive what people are going to do, that 
drive how they function, and that often begins the downhill spiral…. I think things get 
confused and thrown aside when we talk about mental health. It needs to be embedded in 
how people behave…. There’s a place for mental health services, but it’s downstream.”  
Because the concepts of psychological drivers of behavior, psychosocial issues, and mental 
health services often get mixed together and muddled, they are often discounted or put 
aside by planners and responders who are more concerned with the immediate response, 
operational issues, and the provision of medical care to critically injured people.   
Unfortunately, there is less understanding that we can more successfully impact the actions 
people take in an effort to protect themselves if our communication (style, content, tone, 
messenger) takes into account people’s emotional disposition, their likely motivations, and 
information needs. Ultimately, people are motivated by a desire to protect themselves and 
their loved ones. In addition, taking actions one believes to be helpful relieves high levels of 
distress or anxiety. Therefore, we need to help people better understand and trust which 
actions are truly protective in an effort to encourage people to undertake behaviors that 
protect their health and wellbeing and support the overall response effort. 
Issue 4: Preparing Healthcare Facilities 
In the event of a radiological attack, the healthcare system needs 
to be prepared to triage and assist not only the physically injured, 
but also a great many people who are not physically injured but 
are fearful of potential contamination, emotionally distressed, 
experiencing stress-related symptoms, or demanding care.   
 
Healthcare professionals now generally assume that hospitals will be inundated with “walk-
ins” seeking medical assessment after a radiological terrorist attack, and that this influx of 
people will far exceed hospitals’ medical capacities to respond. But how can hospitals best 
manage this influx of people? How do they ensure that limited medical resources are 
directed toward those who need help the most? How can people who are not seriously 
injured, but who are worried about potential exposure or contamination, be assisted in a 
way that doesn’t alienate them or exacerbate their fears? What policies, protocols, and 
guidelines are needed? 
Participants rejected any suggestion that people could simply be turned away. “We believe 
that every one who shows up must be screened,” said a hospital emergency department 
physician. “I don’t know how else to look at somebody and say you’re not exposed or 
contaminated.” Once people are “in the door,” hospitals will need to communicate with each 
of them and conduct medical assessments as well.  
There is, at the present time, no single 
universally accepted approach or template for 
hospitals to use for triaging and managing the 
large influx of people expected to arrive during a 
large radiological terrorism incident. Likewise, 
there is no widely accepted approach indicating in 
specific terms how the so-called “worried well” 
can best be assisted. 
Several approaches and experiences were 
discussed by roundtable participants. One 
approach that was frequently mentioned involves establishing a system whereby people 
who are not physically injured are steered away from the emergency department toward a 
secondary care facility or other area within or near the hospital. The concept is to conduct a 
quick visual screening (prior to triage) as soon as people enter the hospital grounds. This 
would be done in a pre-designated “receiving area,” perhaps outside in the hospital parking 
lot. 
“If we’re doing our job right 
with messaging and 
information, then we will 
reduce the number of people 
showing up in emergency 
rooms.” 
People arriving by ambulance would be triaged in the normal manner, but all “walk-ins” 
would be directed to the receiving station. A specially trained team of healthcare providers 
would be responsible for conducting the initial assessment. People who are physically 
injured would be sent immediately to a medical care area connected to the emergency 
department for triage. Everyone else would be directed toward other areas, where services 
and/or information could be provided.  
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The social service area, staffed by mental health specialists, would serve people exhibiting 
high levels of emotional stress who are not contaminated, exposed, or physically injured. 
This area could be located in the hospital cafeteria, for example. 
Individuals only needing information about hospital services, assessment, radiation effects, 
contamination, and self-protective actions might be sent to an adjoining administration 
building or neighborhood school.  
Participants noted that while life-saving medical services should always take precedence, it 
would be important to integrate mental health expertise and services across the entire 
triage system.  For example, it was suggested that a social worker, psychologist, and 
psychiatrist be stationed in the emergency department. Similarly, it would be important for 
medical personnel to be available in the services and information area to make clear to 
patients that their health concerns are being taken seriously and in case people in those 
areas were misclassified and sent to the wrong area or took an unanticipated turn for the 
worse. 
Participants saw many benefits to the Israeli approach of creating “mild casualty centers.” 
However, there were concerns about whether the approach could be transferred to the U.S. 
context. As one roundtable participant remarked, “The fact is that this country is much 
bigger and some of the strategies simply can’t work here.”  
 
Overall, preparing to manage and assist a large influx of “walk-ins” was seen as critical to 
hospital operations and incident management. At the same time, the best approach would 
be to reduce such problems in the first place through effective information and 
communication strategies. As one participant commented, “If we’re doing our job right with 
messaging and information, then we will reduce the number of people showing up in 
emergency departments.” 
 
Issue 5: A Need to Reconsider the Term “Secondary Care 
Facilities” 
While hospitals may need to establish special assessment and 
alternate care areas for handling large influxes of people following 
a terrorist event, the term “secondary care facility” may need to 
be reconsidered.  
 
A key to preventing hospitals from 
becoming overwhelmed in times of 
terrorism is to establish adjunct medical 
facilities sometimes called, “secondary 
care facilities” that can care for non-
injured populations. A hospital that takes 
in more people that it can handle becomes 
paralyzed. Nevertheless, participants said 
people would continue to self-transport to 
hospitals unless they’re convinced that 
there’s an advantage to being someplace 
else.  
The term “secondary care facility” may be 
problematic because it seems to imply 
care that is not as important or of the 
same quality as that which is provided in 
the emergency department or similar care 
area. Participants said it would be better 
for service providers and patients alike to 
think of the facility as an “annex” to the 
hospital or an area that has been “deputized” as a medical facility and has medical 
personnel on-site; otherwise, people may feel their concerns are not being taken seriously. 
In the words of one participant explained, “simply setting up a tent complex and calling it a 
hospital won’t work.” As another participant said, the facility must be clearly seen to be a 
serious medical treatment facility where “people are being cared for in a responsible way 
and not just being discarded with a label.” 
“On September 11, 2001, we utilized 
the student center… a block and a 
half away from the hospital. We 
took our behavioral health 
counselors, social workers, and 
pastoral care workers and began on-
the-scene psychosocial work right 
there away from the hospital.  It 
really did help relieve congestion 
and get the care started. We’re now 
4 1/2 years past the event and the 
needs continue (because the 
psychological needs of the 
community persist even today…).”   
Various hospitals’ plans call for staffing these facilities with psychologists, psychiatrists, 
social workers, emergency clinicians, and experts in public health and self-protection. In the 
event of a radiological incident, Israel’s hospital system would conduct medical assessments 
at its secondary facilities (“mild casualty centers”) as well. 
Participants recommended that hospitals reach out to the media to get the message out 
about where people should go in times of emergency, and to specifically explain what kind 
of services can be expected.   Advance planning to identify the locations, staff 
arrangements, partnerships with other organizations that can help, what locations and types 
of services will be called, and how this will all be explained to the public will facilitate the 
process in the event of an emergency and enable rapid communication to occur. 
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It also important that the hospital legal team reviews plans for managing the overflow of 
people. Laws and regulations mentioned during the discussion included the Emergency 
Medical Treatment & Labor Act (EMTALA), the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act (COBRA), and Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) 
regulations. 
 
Issue 6: What is Safe? What is Clean? 
There are continuing disagreements regarding radiation health 
effects and what can be considered “safe” or “clean” after a 
radiological terrorism event. 
 
Current discussions about when an area can be considered safe to live, work, or visit after a 
radiological terrorism incident are complicated by scientific disagreements, political and 
economic pressures, fear stemming from past nuclear disasters (such as Chernobyl), and a 
lack of understanding of radiation. These issues contribute to a misperception that only 
“zero is safe” among many segments of society. 
It was agreed that these issues could greatly complicate response and recovery efforts after 
a radiological terrorism event, perhaps generating fear, suspicion, and distrust. It is 
important, therefore, to develop effective processes for making decisions about these issues 
before a disaster strikes. To build trust and confidence, these processes will need to be open 
and inclusive, involving participants from many stakeholder sectors and organizations. 
Chapter IV: Recommendations 
 
This section contains recommendations that were discussed during the two-day roundtable. 
Although they emerged as ideas that many agreed with, they do not represent consensus 
recommendations and no effort was made to develop consensus recommendations from this 
project. 
 
Recommendation 1:  Work with the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) to identify 
opportunities for better incorporating psychosocial preparedness 
into JCAHO standards.   
 
Roundtable participants generally agreed that the psychosocial impacts on individuals and 
communities would be enormous in a large-scale radiological terrorist attack, and that these 
impacts can outweigh even the physical consequences of an incident. Hence the need, they 
said, to better incorporate psychosocial issues into healthcare planning. 
What would motivate hospitals to allocate more resources toward preparedness for the 
psychosocial impacts of a radiological terrorist attack?  In response to that question, 
participants repeatedly referenced two motivating factors:  profit and accreditation.  As one 
participant stated, “Hospitals are driven by profit, and anything that takes a half-day away 
from profit-making is not well received unless it’s necessary for JCAHO accreditation.”   
The group emphasized that JCAHO standards are a major factor in determining how 
hospitals allocate resources.  They said that hospitals are inundated with regulations and 
requirements, and hence focus on “what’s coming next.”  
They said that because current requirements do not speak 
specifically to psychosocial issues, CDC could work with 
JCAHO to assess what can be done to enhance preparedness 
in this area.  
For example, a number of participants expressed the view 
that improved planning for managing “walk-ins” would be 
helpful. One participant, for example, recommended “that 
JCAHO develop some plans for coping with the worried well 
and the walk-ins who will be showing up for treatment of 
some sort. I was at a presentation where it was suggested 
that we just send the worried well home. I don’t think they will want to go home. And in any 
event, I think we need to have a hospital plan across this United States.” 
“You have to think 
about what makes 
people tick.  Without 
certification, people 
don’t train because 
there’s no emergent 
need.” 
 
A related idea on how to build upon hospitals’ existing requirements was to incorporate 
radiological agents in Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) management processes.  Under 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) Hazard Communication 
Standard, employers are required to identify chemical hazards in the workplace, and make 
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MSDS’s, which contain information on use, handling, storage, and emergency procedures, 
available. 
Recommendation 2: Work to better integrate preparedness for 
psychosocial impacts into the Nation’s planning, training, 
exercises, and incident management protocols. 
 
Participants suggested that it was important to better integrate psychosocial issues into all 
of the major components of the Nation’s homeland security program. 
1. National Response Plan (NRP) – This is the Nation’s plan for managing large-scale 
incidents. The Plan incorporates procedures from incident management disciplines (such as 
emergency management, law enforcement, firefighting, public health, and emergency 
medical services) and integrates them into a unified structure. The Plan includes 15 
Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), which provide the structure for coordinating federal 
resources in a national incident.  ESF 8 covers public health and medical services and is led 
by the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services.   
 “These issues still tend to 
be overlooked in most 
exercises.”  
It was noted that the NRP is an evolving document 
and that there could be opportunities for expanding 
ESF 8 to incorporate psychosocial considerations. 
2. National Exercise Program (NEP) – The NEP, managed by the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), conducts national exercises and training programs to prepare 
government agencies for large-scale emergencies.  The largest exercise in the program is 
the Congressionally-mandated Top Officials (TOPOFF) exercise series. TOPOFF is a full-scale 
exercise that plays out over several days, engaging agency leaders and staffs from all levels 
of government.  
TOPOFF was referred to a number of times during the two-day roundtable discussion, 
including TOPOFF exercises that have focused specifically on radiological terrorism (e.g., the 
Seattle exercise). Participants said that psychosocial issues tend to be overlooked because 
they’re often seen as too difficult to deal with. Incorporating psychosocial impacts into 
exercise design, they said, would familiarize everyone connected with the exercise with the 
issues and the resources for dealing with them. “Exercise planners can’t just give lip service 
to the psychological aspects,” said a participant. “People who are worried need resources, 
they’re going to clog up the system, and we need to prepare.” 
3. Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) – This represents 
DHS’ methodology and language for designing, developing, conducting, and evaluating 
homeland security exercises (www.hseep.dhs.gov ). HSEEP is designed to provide a 
standardized approach to assessing and improving preparedness across the Nation. Better 
incorporating psychosocial aspects into HSEEP would represent a significant step forward. 
4. National Incident Management System (NIMS) – NIMS establishes standardized 
processes, protocols, and procedures for responding to emergencies. By using a common 
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language and approach, responders from all levels of government can more efficiently 
deploy and coordinate resources across jurisdictions and agencies. 
An analysis of NIMS would be a positive step for determining opportunities for incorporating 
psychosocial issues in agencies’ emergency response processes and procedures. “We need 
to quantify how psychosocial needs are going to be different from other disaster scenarios, 
and then develop a strategy or doctrine for medical responders related to doing this,” said a 
participant. 
More generally, it was suggested that psychosocial preparedness activities be better linked 
to CDC and other federal grant making. Only by concurrently requiring preparedness and 
providing funding will many of these issues be addressed. 
 
Recommendation 3: Improve the level of realism of psychosocial 
issues in radiological terrorism training exercises. 
 
In addition to suggesting that more psychosocial content be incorporated into training 
exercises, participants recommended that psychosocial content be made better. In 
particular, participants called for the level of realism to be increased. “CDC should inject 
more reality in terms of psychosocial aspects into national planning, training, and exercises, 
such as TOPOFF,” said a participant.  “Perhaps there’s a way to run a train-the-trainer 
course or develop curriculum on how to exercise these capabilities in national programs.”   
Members of the group recommended that several kinds of public behaviors be considered 
for exercise design:   
• People in line not waiting politely for medication, or not willing to wait quietly for 
information; 
• Hospitals being overwhelmed with journalists, walk-ins, and moulaged stress victims;  
• Hospitals being inundated with blood donors; 
• Masses of people bringing clothing and food.   
 
“I would encourage 
exercise planners to 
run the scenario out 
beyond the first few 
hours. A radiation 
event is a long-term 
event. Fear lasts a 
long time.” 
Describing the discrepancy between current exercises and 
what happens in the real world, one hospital-based 
participant said: “You can’t image the volume of people, 
it’s overwhelming.”   
Roundtable participants also advised extending the 
timeframe covered by exercises. “I would encourage 
exercise planners to run the scenario out beyond the first 
few hours. A radiation event is a long-term event. Fear 
lasts a long time.” 
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Recommendation 4: Support education and training programs for 
hospital staff and health department staff by building coalitions 
with professional associations and providing tools and materials 
on radiological terrorism and psychosocial issues.   
 
Throughout the two-day discussion, participants emphasized the need for additional 
education and training for hospitals and health departments. This training is not only 
needed for clinicians, but also for administrative personnel, food service staff, and all 
support staff. Important topics include principles of radiation, health effects, the difference 
between exposure and contamination, self-protection, psychosocial effects, emergency 
response, and roles and responsibilities in a radiological terrorism incident.   
The group encouraged CDC to work with professional organizations to strengthen public 
health and hospital training and education programs. They said that if staff members have a 
better understanding of what to expect in a radiological incident, they’re going to be better 
able to cope with the situation and respond more effectively. It was stated that research 
shows that the potential no-show rate in a radiological incident is greater than 50 percent 
among healthcare providers. Among participants’ comments: 
 “There’s a clear knowledge or educational deficit in terms of what healthcare providers and 
their families and the general population need to know about radiological events.” 
“We have to address the gap in knowledge of many physicians. If the average physician 
can’t explain radiation to a patient we’re in big trouble because that’s the first place they’re 
going to go for information.” 
“We really need to demystify a radiological event.  The whole problem we have is 
disinformation and misinformation.” 
 “The deal breaker is the janitor, the laundry person, the one who puts the food out.  If you 
can’t keep the bed clean and turn over your services, you can’t service any patients.” 
Specific recommendations based on the discussion and comments regarding training are as 
follows: 
A. Infuse trainings with information about the psychosocial impacts of a 
radiological incident and how to anticipate, prepare, and manage them. 
Participants said that training programs should address the anticipated psychosocial impacts 
of large-scale terrorism so that employees know what to look for and what they can do to 
help.  They noted that everyone working in a hospital would come in contact with people 
experiencing psychological impacts, including their fellow employees, incoming patients and 
their families, and existing patients in the hospital. 
“We’re not trying to turn them into 
clinicians.  We’re just giving them a 
heads-up so lots of people have their eyes 
peeled (on psychosocial impacts).” 
“We provide training on the mental 
health aspects of terrorism and risk 
communication.  The first year we 
targeted primarily clinical staff and 
we realized the error of our ways.  
The second year we included a certain 
percentage of security guards, 
receptionists, housekeeping, and all 
those folks because we realize how 
important it is.”   
 
 “Whether it’s the pastoral care worker 
that’s talking to them or the social worker 
or the emergency room nurse, everyone 
needs to be prepared to help look for the 
signs, for those psychosocial effects that 
may come about.” 
“We focus on preparedness to respond, 
but we don’t focus on preparedness to 
recover.  The recovery end has huge 
psychosocial ramifications.” 
B. Provide materials for hospitals and health departments to use to educate and 
inform staff and their families.  Among participants’ specific recommendations 
were: 
• Develop information and materials for physicians, nurses, mental health specialists, and 
other hospital workers (cleaning, laundry, administrative, and food services).   
• Incorporate family preparedness in communications with staff.  Include information 
about how the hospital will communicate with staff in an emergency.  “People won’t 
come to work until they know their family is okay.” 
• Distribute radiation detection cards to healthcare providers.  “Radiation is invisible, but 
you can always take a reading.”  
• Develop posters for emergency rooms on radiation response procedures. 
  
C. Develop leadership training. This might include developing leadership skills for 
hospital administrators and other health professionals so they can effectively lead during a 
disaster.  It might also include providing technical content for leadership guidebooks and 
materials for formal leaders such as elected officials who have the authority during a crisis 
but not the science-based information upon which to make decisions.   
D. Expand trainings for responder teams to include an understanding of the 
specific issues related to radiological disasters.  Partner with established training 
sources for responder professionals (such as EMI) to include psychosocial issues in their 
intensive training exercises.   
E. Encourage the use of appropriate professionals to support the responder 
community.  Participants noted that retired firefighters and retired police officers are often 
recruited for peer counseling during and after disasters. The National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health uses a similar model where miners train other miners about 
mine safety because “you’re not credible unless ‘you’ve been down in the hole.’” 
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Recommendation 5:  Strengthen national partnerships and 
communications systems for disseminating “just-in-time” training 
and information to hospitals immediately following a radiological 
terrorist event. 
 
Roundtable participants called on CDC to collaborate with other federal agencies and 
professional associations to develop an improved national capability to provide 
instantaneous and consistent protocols and information to emergency clinicians across the 
country during emergencies. The delivery mechanisms need to take into account the fact 
that phone, Internet, and other usual means of communications may be overloaded or 
inoperable during a major emergency. Because there are so many organizations that can 
potentially reach clinicians, communities, and the public, identifying and collaborating with 
these networks before a crisis, and leveraging networks, was seen as critical to success. 
Some participants thought that distribution networks should extend beyond the medical 
care community to include the public as well, so that information is provided to local leaders 
and elected officials to share with their constituents and information is made available to 
parents who need to address the unique needs of their children. 
 
 
 “You’ve got to make sure that the federal government’s agent expertise gets down to us at 
the front lines in advance and particularly during the event when the particular agent 
expertise is needed.” 
“After the anthrax incident, we started getting faxes and emails from CDC, HHS, and 
hospital associations, all with slightly different information on how to deal with anthrax.” 
Participants said that hospitals need specific and consistent information about threat agents 
that has the backing and authority of CDC and other federal agencies.  Participants 
discussed focus group research that shows that many hospital emergency department 
clinicians would turn directly to CDC for advice during a radiological event, and believe that 
they would be able to rapidly access whatever information they need to answer specific 
questions about medical management, contamination, decontamination, care of personnel, 
and what to communicate to the public. 
CDC should also be prepared to provide technical assistance and consultation to affected 
regions regarding agents and treatments at the time of a disaster.  Materials and tools that 
are needed by local health and public health officials include information on medical 
countermeasures; recommendations for triage mechanisms and protocols; monitoring and 
surveillance tools, recommendations, and protocols; and information about and access to 
diagnostic tools to help hospitals appropriately categorize patients. 
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Recommendation 6: Recognize the importance of effective 
communication and information strategies in the prevention of, 
and response to, the psychosocial impacts of a large-scale 
radiological terrorism event.   
 
CDC has already conducted a separate roundtable on the communication issues and 
challenges posed by a large-scale radiological terrorism event. Thus, participants in the 
present roundtable did not discuss these matters in great detail. However, the participants 
did recommend that attention be paid to several key issues: 
Develop authoritative multimedia products that can be tested, pre-approved, and 
readied for rapid distribution in a radiological event to state public health personnel, 
hospitals and emergency clinicians, the media, and the public.   
Conduct and share message development and testing research to identify what 
people want and need to know, and how best to communicate it. Some of this work has 
already been conducted. It was recommended that this body of work be shared and 
expanded upon. 
Develop a national media campaign to generate messages and coverage about 
radiological disaster preparedness.  The group also acknowledged that this is not a timely or 
salient issue and that a strong hook would need to be created to generate media interest. 
Be ready to handle enormous volume of calls from the public and other sectors in the 
event of a radiological disaster. It was noted that the outbreak of foot and mouth disease in 
the United Kingdom in 2001 resulted in a virtual torrent of calls from the public.   
Create non-traditional (perhaps) partnerships with organizations that can reach 
effectively into targeted audiences.  Potential partners include the National Association of 
Poison Control Centers, state public information hotlines, and United Way 2-1-1 hotlines.  
There was a good deal of discussion on the importance of engaging faith-based 
organizations, spiritual leaders, and pastors who connect with people in the communities in 
ways mass media cannot.   
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Recommendation 7: Conduct an inventory and assessment of 
federal government and professional association initiatives, 
research, and tools associated with the psychosocial impacts of a 
large-scale radiological terrorism event.   
 
The participants expressed concern that there are many disparate efforts underway to 
address the various aspects of psychosocial impacts of large-scale terrorism, but that these 
efforts were not tied together in any way.  The participants’ recommendation to CDC is to 
identify gaps in knowledge and preparedness, and determine priorities based on a 
comprehensive needs assessment, beginning with an inventory and analysis of what other 
government agencies and professional associations are doing in this area.   
Another aspect of this recommendation is to collect best practices and lessons from around 
the world. These could be focused on understanding and managing the psychosocial aspects 
of a radiological terrorism event, but could also draw more broadly on experience managing 
the needs of the anxious and worried individuals and other issues that were discussed 
during this roundtable.   
In addition, it was suggested that CDC compile information and develop best practices on 
incorporating psychosocial issues into radiological terrorism exercise design and publish 
articles in the public health and medical literatures to disseminate the information. 
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Appendix C: Resources Identified During 
Discussions 
 
Roundtable participants identified a variety of partnership opportunities, existing 
training products, and other resources that can help hospitals, health departments, 
and communities prepare for the psychosocial aspects of a radiological terrorist 
incident. Some of the resources and sources of information that were mentioned 
most in the roundtable discussions are listed below: 
CDC’s Radiation Studies Branch – Provides training and educational products on 
radiological emergency preparedness for clinicians and hospitals, first responders, 
and the public (visit www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/). 
CDC’s Disaster Mental Health Resources – Provides resources on topics such as 
coping with disaster, helping kids and teenagers, as well as information for health 
providers and responders (visit www.bt.cdc.gov/mentalhealth). 
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services’ Office of Public Health and 
Emergency Preparedness (OPHEP) – Serves as the Secretary's principal advisory 
staff on matters related to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies.  
Provides resources for stakeholders, such as the Medical Surge Capacity and 
Capability Handbook (visit www.hhs.gov/ophep).  
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services’ Substance Abuse & Mental 
Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), and Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality (AHRQ) - SAMHSA has a crisis counseling program and 
numerous resources for various audiences. 
American Psychological Association – Provides research and resources on the 
impact of terrorism and disaster on children, resiliency, post-disaster mental health 
interventions, and related issues (visit www.apa.org). 
National Library of Medicine, National Institutes of Health – The world’s 
largest medical library provides information and research services in biomedicine and 
health care (visit www.nlm.nih.gov).  Information for clinicians about treating people 
who have been exposed to radiation is forthcoming.     
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services’ Health Resources Services 
Association (HRSA) - HRSA funds hospital preparedness grants. 
Emergency Public Information and Communications (EPIC) Advisory Board 
Report - This group of experts was convened by HHS to begin to explore public 
information and communication needs during disasters.  The report offers many 
solid, actionable ideas and recommendations.  
Online training courses - Available from the Department of Defense and the 
Emergency Management Institute, which is part of FEMA/DHS. 
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CDC’s Health Alert Network - Noted as a resource for clinicians to become aware 
of medical issues surfacing in their communities. 
The Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee - Managed by 
DHS, this group can and should be incorporated into any CDC effort related to 
radiological disasters. 
National Public Health Information Coalition (NPHIC) - A group of public 
health communicators, affiliated with the Association of State and Territorial Health 
Officials (ASTHO), serves as a networking mechanism for the exchange of methods, 
techniques, and information for the enrichment and improvement of public health 
programs.  Members include directors of public health information at the state and 
local level. 
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Appendix D: Additional Sources Provided by 
Speakers 
Additional information related to the five roundtable presentations may be found in 
the following articles: 
Bar-Dayan Y, Leiba A, Beard P, Mankuta D, Engelhart D, Beer Y, Lynn M, Weiss Y, 
Martonovits G, Benedek P, Goldberg A (1999). A multidisciplinary field hospital as a 
substitute for medical hospital care in the aftermath of an earthquake: the 
experience of the Israeli Defense Forces Field Hospital in Duzce, Turkey, 1999. 
Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 20(2):103-6. 
Beaton R, Stergachis A, Oberle M, Bridges E, Nemuth M, Thomas T (2005). The sarin 
gas attacks on the Tokyo subway 10 years later - lessons learned. Traumatology 
11(2):103-119. 
Becker, SM. (2005). Addressing the psychosocial and communication challenges 
posed by radiological/nuclear terrorism: key developments since NCRP 138. Health 
Physics 89(5): 521-530. 
 
Becker, SM. (2004). Emergency communication and information issues in terrorism 
events involving radioactive materials. Biosecurity and Bioterrorism 2(3): 195-207. 
 
Becker, SM. (2001). Meeting the threat of weapons of mass destruction terrorism: 
toward a broader conception of consequence management. Military Medicine 
166(S2):13-16. 
Leiba A, Halperin P, Priel I, Shamiss A, Koren I, Kotler D, Blumenfeld A, Laor D, Bar-
Dayan Y (in press). A terrorist suicide bombing at a nightclub in Tel Aviv: analyzing 
response to a nighttime, weekend, multi-casualty incident. Journal of Emergency 
Nursing 32(4):294-8. 
Leiba A, Halpern P, Kotler D, Blumenfeld A, Soffer D, Weiss G, Peres M, Laor D, Levi 
Y, Goldberg A, Bar-Dayan Y (2005). Lessons from a terrorist attack in Tel-Aviv 
Market: putting all the golden eggs in one basket might save lives. International 
Journal of Disaster Medicine 2(4):157–160. 
Leiba A, Blumenfeld A, Hourvitz A, Weiss G, Peres M, Laor D, Schwartz D, Arad J, 
Goldberg A, Levi Y, Bar-Dayan Y (2005). Lessons learned from cross-border medical 
response to the terrorist bombings in Tabba and Ras-el-Satan, Egypt, on 07 October 
2004. Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 20(4):253-7. 
Okumura T, Hisaoka T, Yamada A, Naito T, Isonuma H, Okumura S, Miura K, 
Sakurada M, Maekawa H, Ishimatsu S, Takasu N, Suzuki K (2005). The Tokyo 
subway sarin attack-lessons learned. Toxicol Appl Pharmacol. 207(2 Suppl): 471-6. 
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements.  Considerations 
impacting response: psychosocial issues.  In: Management of Terrorist Events 
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Involving Radioactive Material: Recommendations of the National Council on 
Radiation Protection and Measurements (Report #138).    Bethesda, MD: NCRP, 
2001. 
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